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ABSTRACT
In this paper it is argued that Barad’s Agential Realism, an approach to quantum mechanics 
originating in the philosophy of Niels Bohr, can be the basis of a ‘theory of everything’ 
consistent with a proposal of Wheeler that observer-participancy is the foundation of 
everything.  On the one hand, agential realism can be grounded in models of self-organisation
such as the hypercycles of Eigen, while on the other agential realism, by virtue of the 
‘discursive practices’ that constitute one aspect of the theory, implies the possibility of the 
generation of physical phenomena through acts of specification originating at a more 
fundamental level.  Included in phenomena that may be generated by such a mechanism are 
the origin and evolution of life, and human capacities such as mathematical and musical 
intuition.
INTRODUCTION
The quest for a ‘theory of everything’ may be said to have begun with Newtonian mechanics, 
followed by Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, then basic quantum mechanics, later quantum
electrodynamics, then ultimately the ‘Standard Model’, which provides a unified description 
of the strong, weak and electromagnetic forces, and fits the experimental data well.  But the 
task of including gravitation in the ‘theory of everything’ has not turned out so well, the 
outcome being theories that are mathematically elegant, but where there is little or no contact 
with experiment.  Other questions also arise in connection with the idea of a theory of 
everything, such as whether quantum mechanics as such is applicable to biology (1), and 
whether or not it provides an adequate account of observation.
The difficulties cited above may be of little interest to the ‘working physicist’, but they could 
have a similar status to that of the ‘small clouds on the horizon’ that beset classical physics at 
one time, ultimately leading to it being superseded by quantum theory.  Those difficulties 
accordingly merit closer attention.  The approach that seems most promising in this context is 
the realist point of view characterising the ‘agential realism’ of Karen Barad (2), and the 
‘reality of possibility’ concept of Ruth Kastner (3).  The realist position differs from the usual 
one adopted in quantum mechanics in that it attempts to describe what actually happens in the
case of individual events, rather than simply computing averages.  The difference is apparent 
in the case of a typical high-energy physics experiment in which large numbers of individual 
events are observed.  Quantum theory addresses only statistical averages, whereas one can 
imagine instead a theory that can describe what happens individual events.  In confining 
oneself to statistics as is the norm, one may be missing crucial information, as would indeed 
happen in sciences such as astronomy.  This would clearly be the case in astronomy, where 
for example a statistical approach to meteor showers would ignore the occasional peaks.
 The present paper attempts to go beyond the formulations of Barad and Kastner in two ways. 
First of all, a close affinity will be demonstrated between agential realism and certain classical
models of self-organisation, such as Eigen’s hypercycle model, with the conclusion that the 
characteristic features of the quantum domain may merely involve some possibility within the
classical domain, characterised by a particular kind of order.  Quantum mechanics would still 
remain an important area of study, but would no longer be regarded as fundamental, and study
of this specific type of order would then replace particle physics as currently practiced as the 
premier field of study in physics. Further, in this connection it will be shown how a particular 
aspect of agentive realism, namely the evolution of discursive practices, can account for the 
emergence of specific physical phenomena, in rather the same way that discourse within a 
technical community leads to technical advances on the human plane.   Such a picture would 
explain physical reality in a way totally different from the conventional one where some 
specific calculation would account for the details of phenomena.
INDETERMINACY
Barad’s agential realism, an attempt to make sense of the quantum domain in realist terms, is 
a development of ideas due to Niels Bohr, where a central role is played by the concept of 
indeterminacy.  Bohr argued that details of the quantum domain are in general not merely 
uncertain, relating to mere ignorance of the details, but indefinite or indeterminate, in the 
sense that treating values of variables as definite would be contradictory.  For example, when 
a beam of light is split into two by a beam splitter and combined in such a way as to produce 
an observable interference pattern, we may be inclined, considering photons as particles, to 
ask which path was taken by an individual detected photon.  But determining which path a 
given photon had taken, using a suitably placed photon detector, would prevent interference.  
This contradiction implies that the question of which path a particular photon took has no 
acceptable answer.  Bohr infers from this that one should not presume that particular 
assertions about a system of interest are necessarily meaningful; rather, what can be stated 
meaningfully is a function of the context.  Quantum particles are not like classical particles, 
where attributes can be presumed regardless of the context.
AGENTIAL REALISM
Barad considers it a defect of Bohr’s philosophy as stated above that he gives too much 
priority to the situation of the physics experiment, thereby introducing an artificial distinction 
between experiments and the rest of nature.  Furthermore, he ignores the question of what is 
the case (ontology), considering only what can be known (epistemology). To address these 
deficiencies, Barad argues that what is real is the phenomenon, for example the action of 
measurement.   An aspect of such a phenomenon is the agential cut, referring to a separation 
following measurement between a measuring apparatus registering the outcome of a 
measurement (an agent), and something playing the role of an object of measurement.  This 
split is something that can happen in the context of a measurement, but the process described 
is hypothesised to be a more general one, happening under given conditions, producing in 
effect a subject-object split.
Furthermore, as noted by Bohr, we would be wrong to treat what is being measured when a 
measurement is taking place as something abstract such as position; rather the physical 
apparatus related to the abstraction is primary, and only as a limiting case does the 
measurement that the apparatus delivers correspond exactly to a concept that we may have 
such as position or momentum.  In the case of scientific measurements, an existing concept 
does guide the design of the measuring instrument, but this need not be the case in general; 
rather, a concept associated with an agent emerges over time as the agent evolves.
We can, if we wish, view the situation in the following terms.  A quantum particle is not like 
a classical particle, but more like a swarm of insects or birds, where while we can be definite 
that the entity exists, ascribing to the entity concerned it a definite position or velocity is not 
permissible.  Further, there can at times be a phenomenon analogous to a cut, which involves 
the appearance of a further distinguishable entity, or more generally structure of some 
complexity.  Such structures cannot be treated as autonomous entities, but rather as aspects of 
the total phenomenon and contingent upon it (cf. the situation in condensed matter physics, 
where it is understood that both the excitations (quasi-particles), and their interactions, are a 
function of the background medium).  Dependence on the background applies equally to 
relationships between structures, which may also be characterised as phenomena; such 
relationships are primary in that they influence entities that are related; in Barad’s words, 
relationships precede relata.
DISCURSIVE PRACTICE
The analysis can now be taken one step further, taking into account the fact that the activity of
one structure may systematically influence others.  This introduces the idea of a distinction 
between information and the influence of that information.  Such a distinction involves a kind 
of symmetry breaking, where one entity starts to exert control over others, so it becomes a 
supplier of information to other systems.  A further subtlety is Barad’s concept of discursive 
practice.  For information transfer to be able to be effective at achieving some outcome, 
information must be processed in accord with specific rules, and it is the specific behaviour 
associated with the application of such rules that Barad terms discursive practice, which has a 
degree of persistence not applicable to the acts of information exchange themselves.
We now consider discursive practice and its evolution in more detail.  For communication 
between two entities to be effective, they must share a language or discursive system, an 
integrated entity that may involve and evolve many components, some of which involve 
discursive activity itself, whilst others relate this discursive activity to the context of its use, in
other words to non-discursive practices.  Discursive activity is a form of measurement 
process, with discourse relating to what control may be possible.  Thus evolution of 
discursive practice is related to the emergence of new mechanisms for control.
Discursive practices are closely linked with concepts.  Earlier we noted Bohr’s comment that 
while position, for example, appears to be a well-defined concept, a word such as position has
meaning only to the extent that we are able to say what the position of something is.  
Discourse adds precision to this state of affairs, as for example by the way it permits the 
formulation of rules.  In the case of human society, discursive practices have reached a very 
high level of development, and our discussion of the emergence of physical laws will invoke 
the possibility of similar evolutionary development in the quantum domain.
THE ACTIVE ASPECT OF MATTER
Barad views matter as something active, configuring its surroundings so as to continue to 
function effectively (‘concerning itself with what matters’).  Activity as such is by no means 
an unorthodox presumption, since omnipresent activity is familiar both in classical physics, in
the context of molecular motion at finite temperatures, and in the case of quantum-mechanical
zero-point motion.  And in the biological context, matter configuring its surroundings 
appropriately is equally familiar.  What is new here is simply the idea that the quantum 
domain involves similar configurability.
Eigen’s discussions of biological self-organisation (4) are relevant in this context.  The 
question he addresses is how the complicated molecular systems found in biology can sustain 
themselves and also evolve.  He concludes that a structure known as a hypercycle plays a 
crucial role, being able for example to utilise small selective advantages and to be able to 
evolve quickly on the basis of these selective advantages.  Such a system, involving a closed 
cycle of information carriers coding for functional systems that generate the information 
carrier next in the cycle, can also develop branches exhibiting various functionalities, with a 
common element allowing the branches to coexist.  Computer simulations have demonstrated 
the validity of such conclusions.
Eigen’s models involve molecules, but the principles involved could be equally relevant in 
the context of agential realism, provided that structures with corresponding features exist.  
There seem to be no fundamental reasons why this should not be the case, especially in a 
system close to an instability, where non-linearity would be conducive to structure formation.
Hankey (5) has arrived at conclusions somewhat similar to those of Eigen, along the 
following lines. A system that performs a sequence of changes can develop an instability if 
some end product is similar to the starting situation, thereby allowing the cycle to be repeated.
The existence of such cycles can be probed by a general increase in the effective gain, and 
when such cycles emerge changes can be made to enhance the extent to which they are self-
sustaining.  Such self-sustaining cycles are then readily available for use in other situations.  
Learning in general is known to involve similar cyclic processes (i.e. the repetition that 
typically forms an integral part of the learning process).
RELATIONSHIP TO THE POSSIBILIST INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM 
MECHANICS
In Kastner’s ‘possibilist interpretation’ of quantum mechanics (3), the collapse of the wave 
function associated with observation is interpreted as the outcome of a transaction with a 
possibility, which outcome makes something definite, in the same way as in the present 
analysis.  Possibilities are things that can be considered real, but are not necessarily 
actualized, which process Kastner equates with existing ‘within the observable spacetime 
theater’.  The theory developed here can accommodate possibilities but in a different way, 
namely as aspects of discourse rather than something real.  In this way, Kastner’s transactions
with possibilities translate into discourse involving possibilities, of which some may 
subsequently be realised.
 
EVOLUTIONARY AGENTIAL REALISM
John Archibald Wheeler, in his article ‘Law without Law’ (6), explored the hypothesis that 
the ‘observer-participancy’ of quantum mechanics (equivalent to the measurement process 
discussed in the above) could be the basis of a new science that could replace the existing 
‘imposing structure of science’.  The above considerations leave us in a position to understand
how this might be achieved.  The new picture involves agents evolving more and more 
advanced concepts over time, instantiated by evolving discursive practices along the same 
lines as those involved with cultural evolution.  The basic mechanics of evolution would be 
the same, only the context in which that evolution would take place being different.  With 
cultural evolution, we start with regular physics and chemistry, and with nervous systems 
already preprogrammed with mechanisms for developing along particular lines.  Here we start
with a system that knows essentially nothing, but which can explore and learn, provided the 
initial physics supports the kinds of structures and relationships that are required.
As to details, what we know about how children come to make sense of the world is arguably 
relevant, since they also start knowing almost nothing. Piaget (7) made systematic studies of 
the incremental changes that occur during development, each of which can be identified with 
the coming into operation, and utilisation, of a new module.  An example is the development 
of the object concept: at a certain stage in a child’s development an object that is covered up 
so it is no longer visible is treated as if it no longer exists: for example it will stop trying to 
reach it if it had been trying to reach it previously, but later new resources become available 
and actions directed towards the object continue even when it cannot be seen.  There is a clear
logic (8) to the sequence of the incremental changes, as a consequence of the way existing 
skills need to be operational before new ones can be acquired.  The computer model of 
Osborne (9) exemplifies such an incremental process.
As regards the actual mechanics, what has been discussed so far suggests the following 
picture.  From an initial hypercycle the developments envisaged by Eigen and Hankey can 
occur, with new concepts being established through the mechanisms envisaged by Bohr and 
Barad, whereby some apparatus becomes more and more representative of particular concepts
over time.  The fact that this process involves the use of the mechanisms corresponding to a 
concept implies in effect that it is the most useful concepts that get developed in this way.  
Familiar examples in childhood development are those of an object, and number, which get 
clearly defined though apparatus that deals with reality in such terms.
As regards space, we recall that geometry developed originally through the study of 
manipulations involving actual movements in space, and we can imagine the agents of 
agential realism acquiring spatial concepts in the same way.  Barad considers space not as ‘a 
collection of preexisting points set out in a fixed geometry, a container … for matter to 
inhabit’, but rather as the concomitant of a collection of interactions within a system (referred 
to by her as intra-actions), defined as a topology.  How this topological structure is related to 
ordinary geometry is not discussed, but given the relevance that symmetry groups have in 
geometry, one possibility would be that the concepts of transformation and invariance play a 
role, combined with group properties defined in terms of transformations, which together can 
serve to delineate a geometry.  Our subtle agents are presumed to be able to work on the basis
of such concepts to shape a geometry to fit particular specifications.
In the end, discourse can come to cover the question of techniques for creating particular 
kinds of universe, and particular kinds of life in such universes.  Such partly directed 
behaviour could have relevance to questions such as the origin and evolution of life where, 
perhaps as a consequence of the influence of Monod’s writings (10), it has traditionally been 
assumed that there is no preferred direction or meaning in the universe.
CONCLUSIONS
The picture we have arrived at, through the conjunction of a number of theoretical analyses, is
that of a quantum reality containing entities that can come, over time, in effect to understand 
their reality, and to manipulate it, in the same way that a child learns to do this as it grows up.
The physical support for these processes is the equivalent of the evolving self-sustaining 
cycles discussed by Eigen and Hankey, which picture corresponds closely to that derived by 
Barad starting from Bohr’s analyses of quantum reality.  The conclusion is that under certain 
conditions matter can organise itself in ways according with agential realism, while at the 
same time agential realism, through the evolution of discursive practices, implies the 
possibility of primordial matter being able to create universes with specified physical laws, 
and being able to influence phenomena in these universes.
Support for this picture may come from the existence of human skills such as mathematical 
and musical intuition, which point to the ability to access levels of understanding that are hard
to explain on conventional grounds (11).  There are some parallels between the present 
situation and that which prevailed at the time when the atomic theory was being developed, in
that the latter postulated a deeper reality capable of accounting, in simple terms, for a number 
of phenomena, such as the specific heat and thermal conductivity of gases that were, at that 
time, characterised in purely mathematical terms, with no underlying model.  Taking the 
hypothesised deeper reality seriously led to considerable advances in science.
While this the view presented here is very different to the usual one, there is nothing irrational
about it; it merely contradicts ideas that are commonly held, and these ideas would be 
irrational themselves if held as dogma.  It must be for the future to examine the ideas 
presented here in detail, and to see how well they hold up to examination.
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